This paper presents an estimation of the cost of reducing CO 2 emissions as agreed in Kyoto by Annex I countries. Unlike most of the existing literature, this paper focuses on European Union countries abatement costs and, using a simple model, estimates the role of each EU country within a EU market as well as an Annex 1 market. As a major result, marginal (and total) abatement costs for each EU country (as well as the EU total cost) are presented. Some conclusions on the redistribution of income among market participants related to the trading system are also shown.
Introduction
Annex 1 countries signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. These countries agreed to reach a fixed level of greenhouse gas emissions by 2008-2012 (see Table 1 ). Most countries accepted a substantial emission reduction, some an emission stabilisation. Few countries are allowed to increase their emissions up to the agreed quantity.
The emission reduction is clearly expected to involve costs, at least for some countries: reducing emissions requires either the implementation of appropriate technological changes in energy consumption or the reduction of the energy consumption itself; in any case, reducing emissions involves a social and economic price to be paid.
The Kyoto Protocol allows for the use of flexibility mechanisms, whereby countries mitigate their compliance costs.
This work focuses on emission trading. Different scenarios corresponding to the participants in the market (EU (European Union), Annex 1 without the FSU (Former Soviet Union), Annex 1 with the FSU) and the limitations in using emission trading are presented. For each scenario the market price of one ton of carbon as well as the total abatement cost each country has to pay is obtained. While the Kyoto Protocol considers six different greenhouse gases this paper is limited to the most relevant emission i.e. CO 2 (Carbon dioxide).
The economic literature has discussed and presented the issue of determining abatement costs implied by the Protocol, with and without emission trading and the other flexibility mechanisms.
Some of this literature is examined in section 3. However, in existing literature either EU is treated as a single entity within an Annex 1 market or, as in the isolated case of Bader (2000) , EU countries are considered separately, but the market is limited to Europe. The aim of this paper is to consider each European country as a different subject within the EU market but also within an Annex 1 market. Section 4 and 5 present the methodology adopted and other major numerical results.
The market for emission permits
The Kyoto-related cost for a single country is obtained considering two different scenarios and their difference in terms of cost. The first scenario is the Business as Usual (BAU) forecasted emission level which represents a zero-cost scenario. On the other hand, an alternative scenario is required with a target in terms of forecasted emissions. In this context total abatement means the difference between BAU emissions and Kyoto requirement emissions and the year 2010, which is central to the period considered in the protocol, is used as a reference year.
The cost of emission reduction is described by the marginal abatement cost (MAC). Using MAC curves, demand and supply of emission permits can be derived. In principle, in order to minimise costs, each country's reduction will be such that the MAC corresponding to that reduction will be equal to the price of the permits. If the reduction so obtained is higher than the requirement, the country will sell permits, contributing to the supply in the permits market. Conversely, if the reduction is lower than that required, the country will contribute to the demand of permits (see figure 1 ). The market-clearing condition determines the market price of emission permits.
Review of the literature
Different authors have discussed the issue of determining MAC curves using various strategies and the main solutions that have been proposed can be briefly outlined. Results vary widely depending on the methodology. However, most of the papers use MAC curves derived from detailed technological (bottom up model) or macroeconomic models.
Ellerman and Decaux (2000) analyse the impact of permit trading using estimated MAC curves. At price P, country A will reduce by R A , whereas country B by R B . Since the commitment of country A is lower than R A (the price P A is lower than P), Country A will be a supplier of permits. Viceversa Country B will demand permit. The market involving A and B will be in equilibrium for a price P such that (R A -C A )+ (R B -C B )=0. Most of the models show that, since the FSU has the lower MAC, this region will be the main supplier of permits. In 2010 every OECD region will be a net buyer of permits. Results also indicate that the size of the market will vary from model to model and that, in general, the United States would cover a lower percentage of its emissions from trading than would Japan and the European Union.
Finally, the importance of the hot air issue is underlined by all the models. The existence of a hot air bubble would affect the overall cost and efficiency of emission reduction with a higher level of emissions for Annex I countries under a tradable emission scheme than under an autarkic system.
Estimating abatement costs
For all countries other than those of the FSU, the approach of this paper follows Bader (2000).
First, a carbon demand function is estimated for each country. Since neither the market (trade) nor the price of Carbon are real , it is essential to preliminarily estimate quantities and price of this virtual market. The way these quantities are obtained is explained in the appendix. In short: carbon demand is a function of carbon price calculated as the ratio of the total expenditure of carbon fuels and their total carbon content. The time series of carbon prices are shown in figure 2. The difference between prices in different countries is due both to different prices of specific fuels and to the different composition of fuel demand. Thus it should be noted that these series are not genuine collected time series but estimates and so they contribute to the uncertainty of the results. The extent to which these data are reliable is examined in the appendix: the key issue is the percentage of emissions covered by the fuel considered in determining the price.
The estimated carbon demand function has the form
where EN is the share of Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) covered by carbon-free energy sources; t C the Carbon emission;
t GDP the gross domestic product and t p the price of Carbon ( c P in the appendix). Our aim is to estimate the demand for carbon as a function of price and, when appropriate, of other variables.
For each country the following regression has been estimated ( )
including or excluding as appropriate EN in order to avoid multicollinearity with prices or the inclusion of a non relevant variable. The estimates are obtained either by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or by Johansen or Engle-Granger cointegration procedure, according to stationarity and order of integration of the series. In some cases, a reduced sample has been used, in particular when on the whole sample a non linear relation could be detected. Details on estimates can be found in Table   2 .
Since the aim of this paper is to investigate the cost of carbon abatement we simply ignore those countries for which the coverage of emissions is not satisfactory such as Luxembourg. Moreover, we excluded from the analysis those countries for which carbon turns out to be a Giffen good (Portugal, Greece and New Zealand, see figure 7 ) since the positive relationship between price and quantity of carbon would lead to negative abatement costs.
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The main problems in estimating regression functions were the non linearity of the relationship and the non stationarity of dependent variables and regressors. We could eliminate some of the nonlinearity problems simply by reducing the sample used for some countries or by introducing dummy variables. In fact, by examining the graphs of price and emissions, we observed that non linearity was due to a sudden change in the behaviour of the two series, usually related to a change in the behaviour of Log(EN). In those cases we allow only for the more recent structure, dropping the first years or estimating different regression parameters for the different periods (technically this was achieved by introducing a dummy) and keeping those estimates with those from the more recent years. Non stationarity of dependent variables and covariates must be allowed for in almost all regressions (see Table 2 where the results of stationarity tests are summed up). Two different situations must be distinguished according to the characteristics of the dependent variable: I(0) or I(1). If the dependent variable is I(1), given that the price series is always I(1), a cointegrating equation between at least Log(C) and Log(PC) must be found. Johansen or Engle and Granger procedures were used and Log(EN) was added as a regressor whenever possible: it must be I(1 The MAC curve for the FSU could not be estimated in this way because price data were missing .
To consider the FSU in our simulation we simply quote the MAC obtained by Ellerman (2000). We note that BAU forecasted emissions for the FSU are lower than the commitment by 111 Mton, in a MAC curve this is zero for an abatement of less than 111 Mton.
Emission trading and abatement costs
Estimated MAC curves are shown in figure 3 as a function of the percentage of abatement. Some important differences (even within EU countries) should be observed. As expected from previous literature Japan and Italy have uniformly higher MAC curves, whereas the USA and Australia have MAC curves lower than those of the other developed countries. The MAC curve for FSU, as already anticipated, is zero for an abatement less than 111 Mton (the hot air effect) and then grows sharply for abatement above this amount. By comparing these curves we get the cost of emission reduction and not the cost of Kyoto requirements. These are compared in Table 1 where MAC and total abatement costs corresponding to Kyoto compliance are reported. Table 1 shows that Denmark is by far the Annex 1 country with the highest marginal Kyoto cost, due to a substantial commitment (almost 29% of BAU forecasts). In contrast France and Belgium show marginal costs lower than those of the USA, despite uniformly higher MAC curves, because of their relatively small commitments. Analogous considerations apply to the total abatement costs as a percentage of GDP. MAC curves define a supply and a demand curve of emission permits and so they can be used to determine the equilibrium price of permits and, consequently, the number of permits each country would sell or buy at equilibrium price. This analysis has been performed under various hypotheses on the countries that participate in the market and on the limitations of the market itself.
Let us consider first a EU market, closed to non-EU countries. The market price obtained using this hypothesis is US$211 TC, whereas the total abatement cost is 10 bln$, saving approximately 12 bln$ with respect to the no trading case. Figure 4 illustrates a comparison of the cost distribution among EU. Denmark's share of cost is dramatically reduced (from US$6.7 billion, corresponding to 31% of total EU expenditure, to US$894 million, corresponding to 9.4%), in fact, in the unlimited trading case Denmark buys permits to cover 86% of the commitment. In contrast, France and Belgium show a negative cost; thanks to their low MACs and commitments, they are able to obtain a net income by selling permits. Spain shows negative abatement cost because its commitment is higher than BAU forecast and can obtain a net income by selling permits. The limited trading case shows clearly that an unlimited market in not needed to dramatically reduce abatement costs of In fact if purchases are limited, for each country, to 20% of its commitment, the market price will become US$160 /tC and the total abatement cost 13.8 bln$, less than 5 bln$ more than the unlimited trading case. On the other hand, if the sales of each country are limited to 20% of its commitment, then the market price increases to 462 $/tC, but the total abatement cost is 13.3 bln$, still much lower than the no-trading case. Of course the earnings of Belgium and France would now be greatly reduced. (2000) is there a similar case, but the comparison between the results of this paper and Bader's is difficult due to a different methodology: Bader estimates the parameters of the MAC curve for the whole of Europe, so that the same shape applies to all EU countries. This means that differences in the MAC are given only by differences in the commitments and in the starting value of the ratio C/GDP. Nevertheless, following a different approach this paper agrees with Bader's ranking of countries. Ultimately, the market price determined by Bader is 81$/tC, much less than our estimation, and the same can be said of total abatement costs. However the percentage cost reduction due to the market is, according to both Bader's and our calculations, around 50%.
Only in Bader
Opening the market to non-European countries such as Australia, USA, Canada and Japan results in a market price of 142.6 $/tC (in the unrestricted market case). This further reduction is mainly due to the United States, which has a low MAC and so can cover at low cost 66% of the total abatement and is the main supplier of permits (57% of the total supply). The other big suppliers are Australia, which provides 24% of the total supply of permits, and France (13%). Belgium, Spain and Ireland together provide less than 6%. All the other countries demand permits. The US commitment accounts for 72% of the total commitment of the countries considered. If trading is unlimited the United States will sell 52 Mton of C, corresponding to approximately 7% of the total reduction. This lowers the total abatement cost from 81 bln$ to 42 bln$, more than half of which is spent by the USA as can be seen in figure 5 . Other suppliers of permits are Australia, Ireland, Spain, Belgium and France, that, because of their relatively low commitment, gain a net income from trading. Japan and Denmark, being the two countries that benefit most from trading, reduce their expenses to 20% and 10% of the no-market case. Costs relative to limited trade scenarios are compared in figure 5 (columns (C) (D) (E)) which illustrates that limitations up to 20% of the commitments still allow a dramatic reduction in abatement costs. The highest total cost is incurred with a 20% of purchase limitation: 60.2 bln$. Finally, we evaluate a market open also to the FSU, whose commitment is higher than BAU forecasted emissions. For this reason, the MAC of the FSU is zero for abatement below the difference between commitment and BAU emissions. In practice, a supply of 111 Mton is introduced, leading to an important reduction of costs as can be seen in figure   5 : the FSU earns US$13.1 billion from trading and the USA buy permits.
In figure 6 the results of the Annex 1 permits market with and without the FSU for each country are illustrated in more detail. Price estimates for the Annex 1 market are easier to find in literature, and our results are similar to the values obtained by other authors quoted in section 2. Adequate consideration should be given to the different methodologies used, because some models consider the European Union as a single area and do not analyse European countries separately.
Conclusions
The empirical part of this paper shows that, without transaction costs, a market of permits should help to reduce the individual and total costs of emission abatement. Clearly, the higher the ceiling on sales and purchase, the smaller the cost reduction.
According to economic theory, a trading permit scheme should help to attain an efficient allocation, but is completely neutral with respect to any equity consideration. In fact, a country would be a buyer or a seller of permits depending on its endowment, that is, on its initial commitments. Since commitments are basically political agreements, it is useful to underline that they should be defined carefully: the definition of commitments may produce a redistribution of income (via tradable permits) from countries that have adopted mitigation measures to countries that have not. In fact, probably, the latter can still implement cheaper measures whereas the former have only expensive options to reduce emissions. In this sense, Kyoto commitments seem to lead to will also be slightly different. Further lines of research include: a specific study on the role of the FSU. Its market position suggests that it may act as a monopolist, and so its aim might not be to minimise costs, as in this model. For example, the FSU could wait until the deadline fixed by the Kyoto Protocol to sell permits at a higher price to countries at risk of non compliance. It is also true that the FSU comprises a number of countries and this may mitigate the monopoly, but there is a reasonable possibility that they may still act as a group.
The absence of transaction costs is a second main defect of this model and a market with transaction costs would allow less savings than the no friction market we assumed.
Appendix: price and quantities of the carbon market. Price data are always end user prices and contain energy or CO 2 taxes, set at different levels in each country. They are expressed in terms of US$ PPP in order to even out the differences in the general price level of EU countries.
Fuel consumption data by sector were extracted from the IEA database. The fuel classification by type considered in this database is less refined than the one used for prices.
In particular, all gasoline and diesel for motors are grouped in the household sector, and highsulphur fuel oil (HSFO) and low-sulphur fuel oil (LSFO) are grouped in the industrial sector. The aggregate fuel oil consumption for households has been split into diesel and gasoline according to the observed ratios of gasoline/diesel consumption derived from "Energy Statistics of IEA Countries". That is, DIESEL consumption is α×(TOTAL MOTOR FUELS) where α is the share of diesel consumed as motor gasoline as well as diesel used in households. GASOLINE is calculated in the same way. Furthermore, we equally subdivided the figure for aggregate gasoline in LEADPREM, LEADREG; UNPREM95; UNPREM98 and UNREG. Italy we see again that the level is quite stable over the past 20 years and also observe that the coverage level of carbon emissions is uniformly higher. In other words 75% of the fuel consumed in
Italy produces 85% of carbon emissions, meaning that we tend not to use the less carbon-intensive fuels.
The lowest consumption coverage levels are registered by Sweden and France. Both countries have a percentage of TPES covered by hydro and nuclear close to 46% In both cases a significant amount of end-use demand is not considered in our calculation, but its contribution to carbon emissions is near zero.
Analogously, the lowest emission coverage levels are registered by Germany and Greece. Both countries show 25% to 35% of TPES covered by brown coal. Figure 2 reports the time series of Carbon price for EU-15 countries. 80,000 
Bibliography
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) S FSU USA J CAN AUS UK NL IT IR SW D FR FI DE B A
